DELIVERABILITY — CASE STUDY

One record stood between a pre-IPO firm and a spoofable domain

A US pre-IPO company (name withheld)

100%of sending domains enforcing DMARC at quarantine after the fix
~6 monthswith one operator owning deliverability end to end
8sending domains audited one by one
1domain still at p=none, the reply subdomain
43domains in the account the sending estate was found in
pct=100full enforcement in the raised DMARC policy
3public DNS checks used to verify the new record live

How it worked

STEP 1

Single-owner deliverability across the whole estate

STEP 2

Domain-by-domain public DNS audit of 8 sending domains

STEP 3

DMARC raised from p=none to quarantine at pct=100

STEP 4

Aggregate reporting address added to the record

OUTCOME

100% of sending domains enforcing DMARC at quarantine after the fix

Meet the company

A US company on the road to an IPO, sending at real scale: marketing mail, product mail, and reply traffic across a root domain and several sending subdomains. The company's name stays off this page, as it should.

The challenge

Deliverability had no single owner. SPF, DKIM, DMARC, spam filters and inbox placement were everybody's side job, which meant they were nobody's job. And the estate was buried in noise: 43 domains sat in the company's DNS account, parked, legacy and live all mixed together, so first the actual sending estate had to be separated out.

The estate mostly looked fine, and mostly was, except for the detail attackers love: one reply subdomain still sitting at DMARC p=none, the setting that watches spoofing happen and does nothing about it.

For a company approaching an IPO, a spoofable domain is not a technical footnote. It is a headline waiting for a date.

The solution

One owner, whole estate

For about six months from the start of 2026, one operator held complete charge of the company's email deliverability: DKIM, DMARC and SPF records, spam filter behaviour and inbox placement, across every sending domain.

Audit every domain, not the average

Each of the 8 sending domains was checked individually on public DNS. Seven were already enforcing at quarantine: the root domain, four sending subdomains, and two mail domains on sister brands. Estates fail at their weakest domain, not their average one, so the audit went domain by domain until the weak one surfaced: the reply subdomain, its record reading simply v=DMARC1; p=none, with nothing else set.

Raise it, then verify it live

On September 28, 2026, the reply subdomain's DMARC was raised to v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100, with an aggregate reporting address added, and the change was verified live on public DNS across three separate checks.

The results

After the fix, every sending domain on the estate enforces DMARC at quarantine: the root, all sending subdomains, the two sister-brand mail domains, and the reply subdomain that had been the open door.

One item stayed open and was flagged openly rather than buried: DKIM signing on that reply subdomain could not be confirmed from public DNS, because the common selectors returned no key. It was recorded as a follow-up for the sending platform's owner, in writing, the same day.

The return on one record change: a pre-IPO company whose every sending domain now enforces against spoofing. The fix cost an audit and an edit. The gap, at IPO visibility, would have been priced in headlines, and we will not invent a dollar figure for that. The honest ROI is risk removed before it was priced by someone else.

FAQ

Why does p=none not protect a domain?

Because p=none is monitor mode. It asks receivers to send reports about spoofed mail, but tells them to deliver it anyway. Quarantine and reject are the settings that actually stop spoofing.

How do you raise enforcement safely?

Confirm SPF and DKIM alignment first on real sending traffic, read the aggregate reports for anything legitimate that would break, then raise the policy and verify the new record on public DNS. Skipping the report reading is how teams quarantine their own invoices.

What should be checked monthly?

DMARC policy and alignment on every sending domain, DKIM signing status, SPF record size and lookups, and blocklist status for sending IPs. Estates drift; the monthly check is what catches it.

By the numbers

with one operator owning deliverability end to end~6 months
sending domains audited one by one8
domain still at p=none, the reply subdomain1
domains in the account the sending estate was found in43
full enforcement in the raised DMARC policypct=100
public DNS checks used to verify the new record live3

Bars are scaled so very small and very large numbers fit on one chart. The values printed are exact.

THE ROI
1

record changed: the single p=none policy that left the whole estate spoofable

One record change closed the spoofing door on every sending domain the company owns.

What was built

The concrete pieces this engagement shipped, in one list.

Your mail is being sent unauthenticated. Here is the full fix.

Lower stack cost. Back in the inbox. Built to send at any scale.

We rebuild it properly: secondary domains, inboxes, SPF, DKIM and DMARC set to enforcement, warmup and safe sending limits, blacklist monitoring on top. Send-ready in about 17 days. No campaigns, no copy, no lead lists. Infrastructure only.

Almost a decade building cold outreach infrastructure, including his own sending and verification stack built from scratch. 20+ B2B clients at companies worth $10M and above, all in tier one countries.

Free · Written plan + fixed price · No sales call required

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